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We study the effect of ownership structure and regulatory independence
on the interaction between capital structure and regulated prices using a
comprehensive panel data of publicly traded European utilities. We find that
firms in our sample tend to have a higher leverage if they are privately controlled
and regulated by an independent regulatory agency. Moreover, the leverage of
these firms has a positive and significant effect on their regulated prices, but not
vice versa. Our results are consistent with the theory that privately controlled
regulated firms use leverage strategically to obtain better regulatory outcomes.
1. Introduction
The wave of privatization and institutional reforms that swept net-
work industries in Europe during the 1990s dramatically affected
the incentives, strategies, and performance of regulated utilities. One
peculiar and often neglected aspect of this process is the change in their
capital structure: casual observation suggests that regulated utilities
have substantially increased their financial leverage since the early
1990s. This trend is widespread across countries and across sectors,
and seems to be independent of the leverage boom that fed the global
crisis in the second half of 2000s. For example, Telefonica de Espana, the
Spanish incumbent telecom operator, increased its leverage after being
privatized in 1997 from 36% to 68% in 2005; Autostrade per l’Italia, the
largest freight road operator in Italy, increased its leverage from 32% in
1999, when it was completely privatized, to 88% in 2003; National Grid
Group Plc, the UK energy transport operator, increased its leverage
from 30% in 1997 to 72% in 2005; and Anglian Water Plc, the largest
water company in England and Wales, raised its leverage from 7% in
1997 to 49% in 2005. A joint study of the UK Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) and the HM Treasury (DTI-HM, 2004) has expressed
a concern about the “dash for debt” or “flight of equity” within the
UK utilities sector from the mid-late 1990s and argued that such high
leverage “could implygreater risks of financial distress, transferring risk
to consumers and taxpayers and threatening the future financeability
of investment requirements” (DTI-HM, 2004, p. 6).1 Similar concerns
have been recently expressed by the Italian energy regulatory agency,
2005-028647). Carlo Cambini and Laura Rondi gratefully acknowledge financial support
from the Italian Ministry of Education (No. 2006130472_002).
1. For a related report, see Ofwat andOfgem (2006). In December 2008, the UK energy
regulatory agency, Ofgem, published a position paper that sets out the arrangements
for responding in the event that a network company experienced financial distress (see
Ofgem, 2008). In particular, Chapter 4 of the position paper considers the scope for
reopening a price control in case of a financial distress, the factors that are likely justify
this procedure, and its key elements.
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AEEG, which announced its intention to start monitoring the financial
leverage of Italian energy utilities in order to discourage speculative
behavior that might jeopardize their financial stability (see AEEG, 2007;
p. 38).
Given these concerns, it is clearly important to understand the
determinants of the capital structure of regulated firms and its impli-
cations for regulated prices. Existing empirical literature has focused,
however, almost exclusively on the U.S., where the high leverage of pri-
vately owned regulated utilities is a well-known and well-documented
phenomenon.2 Yet, the institutional framework in Europe differs from
that in the U.S. in at least two important respects. First, while large
utilities in the U.S. were always privately owned, private ownership
and control of utilities in the EU is still the exception rather than the
rule—despite the privatization wave of the last two decades, many
EU utilities are still controlled by central or local governments (see
Bortolotti and Faccio, 2008). Second, utilities in the U.S. were subject to
rate regulation by state and federal regulatory commissions since the
1910s. In the EU by contrast, Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRA)
were established only recently and are fully operational only in the
energy and the telecom sectors; in other sectors, such as transports and
water, utilities are still regulated directly by ministries, governmental
committees, or local governments.
In light of these institutional differences, we believe that it is
important to study the capital structure of regulated utilities in the
EU and its interaction with regulated prices, and examine if and how
this interaction varies across ownership structures and whether and
how it is affected by the existence of an IRA. To this end, we have
constructed a comprehensive panel data on 92 publicly traded EU
utilities over the period 1994–2005. Our data covers practically all
major publicly traded regulated utilities in the EU-15 member states
before the 2004 enlargement. These firms were involved in major
privatization transactions that account for almost a half of the EU-15
total privatization revenues across all sectors (including banking and
insurance, oil companies, basic materials, and consumer goods).
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first systematic
study of the capital structure of EU utilities and the first to exam-
ine empirically the relationship between capital structure, regulated
prices, ownership structure, and regulatory independence. Our analysis
reveals the following:
2. See for example, Bowen, Daly, and Huber (1982), Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984),
Smith (1986), and Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003).
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(i) Firms tend to have higher leverage when they are privately
controlled and regulated by an IRA.
(ii) When firms are privately controlled and regulated by an IRA,
leverage Granger-causes regulated prices (but not vice versa).
When firms are state controlled, levterage and regulated prices
do not Granger-cause one another.
These results hold even after controlling for various firm-specific
characteristics such as size, asset tangibility, profitability, and non debt
tax shield, and for key features of the macroeconomic and institutional
environment, such as the growth rate of GDP, the political orientation
of the government, and the strength of the legal protection of investors’
rights. Result (i) suggests that the “dash for debt” phenomenon is a
by-product of the transition towards private-control of utilities in the
EU and regulation by independent agencies. Result (ii) supports the
concerns of regulators that the financial leverage of regulated firms
may lead to higher prices. However, leverage does not necessarily
hurt consumers: to the extent that high prices boost the incentives of
regulated firm to invest, it may benefit consumers by allowing them to
enjoy better and more reliable services.
As mentioned earlier, existing empirical studies on the capital
structure of regulated firms have mainly focused on the U.S. Taggart
(1985) finds that electric utilities have increased their debt-to-equity
ratios following the introduction of rate regulation in various states in
the U.S. in the 1910s. He argues that this increase may have been due
to the fact that state regulation made the business environment safer
for utilities, but cannot rule out the possibility that some utilities may
have adopted higher debt-to-equity ratios in an attempt to win price
concessions from regulators. Hagerman and Ratchford (1978) show
that, for a sample of 79 electric utilities in 33 states, the allowed rate-of-
return on equity is increasing in the debt-equity ratio.3 Dasgupta and
Nanda (1993) study a cross-section of U.S. electric utilities, and find that
firms operating in less pro-firm regulatory environments tend to have
higher debt-equity ratios. Klein, Phillips and Shiu (2002) study a cross-
section of U.S. property-liability insurers and find strong and robust
evidence that the degree of price regulation and its stringency have
positive effects on the insurers’ leverage. Bulan and Sanyal (2005) study
a panel of U.S. investor-owned electric utilities for the period 1990–2000
and find that they reduced their debt-to-total assets ratios in response
to the heightened regulatory and competitive uncertainty created by
3. Besley and Bolton (1990) find in a survey of 27 regulatory agencies and 65 utilities
that approximately 60% of the regulators and utilities surveyed believe that an increase
in debt relative to equity increases regulated prices.
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the deregulation process. Bulan and Sanyal (2006), use a similar panel
to show that after deregulation, U.S. investor-owned electric utilities
respond to growth opportunities in a two-step process: first, they
accumulate financial slack in anticipation of new growth opportunities,
but then, when the growth opportunities become more viable, they use
debt finance to finance them.Ovtchinnikov (2008) studies a large sample
ofU.S. firms in industries thatwere subject to some formof deregulation
during the 1966–2006 period, including entertainment, petroleum and
natural gas, electricity, telecommunications, and transportation. He
finds that following deregulation, firms reduce their leverage by about
30%, and moreover, leverage becomes much less negatively correlated
with profitability and market-to-book ratios and much more positively
correlated with firm size. To the best of our knowledge, the only
paper that does not focus on the U.S. is Correia da Silva, Estache and
Jarvela (2006). They examine the leverage of 121 regulated utilities in
16 less developed countries over the period 1991–2002 and find that
leverage varies significantly across sectors, with the highest leverage
being observed in transportation and the lowest in water supply. They
also find that leverage steadily increases over time while investment
levels fall.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
a brief institutional framework of the regulatory environment in the
EU. Section 3 presents the theoretical background and the empirical
implications that we test. We describe our panel data in Section 4 and
present our empirical results in Sections 5 and 6. Concluding remarks
are in Section 7.
2. Background: Liberalization and Structural
Reforms in European Network Industries
Following a big wave of nationalization after the Second World War,
network industries in Europe were largely dominated by vertically
integrated, stated-owned, monopolies. Under this regime, utilities were
viewed as an operational branch of the government andwere instructed
to provide universal services at low prices, absorb unemployment,
and invest in infrastructure. The government in turn played the dual
role of owner and “regulator,” and set tariffs, quality standards, and
investment levels. This arrangement however created ill-performing
and highly inefficient public monopolies (Megginson and Netter, 2001).
Starting from the mid 1980s, the European Commission has
promoted a gradual liberalization process intended to improve the
efficiency and service quality of EU public utilities and boost their
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investments. In particular, the European Commission has enacted a
number of directives aimed at setting up a common regulatory frame-
work for EU member states, which were in turn required to transpose
these directives into national legislation. However, the Commission left
the decision about the ownership structure of utilities in liberalized
markets entirely in thehands of national governments.As a result,many
privatizedutilities in theEUare still partially owned either by state or by
local governments, despite being publicly traded in the stock exchange.
In some cases, the state holds a “golden share” in the firm that grants
the state special control rights, including the right to appoint board
members, veto proposed acquisitions, and cap shareholders’ voting
rights.4
The extent of effective liberalization varies considerably across
member states and across industries. In telecommunications, liberal-
ization started in 1987 with the publication of the Green Paper for the
Development of the Common Market for telecommunication services
and equipment. The Green Paper was followed by a sequence of direc-
tives, starting from Directive 90/388 on “Competition in the markets
for telecommunications services,” which established the institution of
national IRAs in eachmember state.5 In the energy sector, the European
Commission has been undertaking legislative actions since 1988 to
establish an internal energy market for both electricity and natural gas
within the EU. The milestone legislation is Directive 96/92 for the elec-
tricity, followed by Directive 98/30 for the gas market; these directives
aimed at gradually introducing competition in generation/production
anddistribution, and at unbundling thedifferent segments in the energy
value chain. Importantly, these directives established independent
national regulatory agencies.6 Table I shows the year in which an IRA
in telecommunications and in energy were established, as well as the
extent of privatization in these years. The table shows that inmost cases,
the establishment of an IRA preceded large scale privatization, which
is consistent with EU policy guidelines that required member states to
“ensure effective structural separation of the regulatory functions from
4. For a more comprehensive analysis of the privatization process in Europe, see
Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco (2003).
5. Art. 7 Directive 90/388/EC and also preamble 11 to Directive 96/19/CE.
6. Art. 20Directive 96/92/EC andArt. 21 of Directive 98/30/EC. Initially, the national
energy IRAs were granted powers to settle disputes among operators and were only
required to be independent from the regulated firms. Over time, however, EC legislation
has broadened the powers of the IRAs to encompass the responsibility for ensuring non-
discrimination, effective competition, and the efficient functioning of the market, along
with the implementation of unbundling rules (see Art. 23 Directive 2003/54 and Art. 25
Directive 2003/55).
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Table I.
The Timing of Regulation and Privatization in the
Energy and Telecommunications Sectors in the
EU-15 Member States
Energy (Electricity and Gas) Telecommunications
Country
Date of
Establishing
an Energy
IRA
Privatization
Revenues
before an IRA
was Established
Date of
Establishing a
Telecom IRA
Privatization
Revenues before
an IRA was
Established
Austria 2000 70.8% 1997 0%
Belgium 1999 10.1% 1991 0%
Denmark 1999 0% 2002 100%
Finland 1995 0.4% 1987 0%
France 2000 2.5% 1996 2.2%
Germany 2006 100% 1996 0%
Greece 2000 0% 1992 0%
Ireland 1999 n.a. 1997 0%
Italy 1995 0% 1997 5.7%
Netherlands 1998 0% 1997 41.9%
Portugal 1995 12.9% 2001 100%
Spain 1998 52.6% 1996 22.2%
Sweden 1998 0% 1992 0%
UK 1989 18.6% 1984 3.1%
activities associatedwith ownership or control” (Directive 97/51 for the
telecommunication industry; see also Gilardi, 2005).
Unlike the telecommunications and energy sectors, the liberaliza-
tion efforts in the water and transportation sectors are still in early
stages. At present, privatization activity is still limited, and, with the
exception of the UK, where firms were privatized and two IRAs were
established to regulate the water industry (Ofwat) and the railway
industry (ORR), no IRAs were yet established, and privatization is still
extremely limited and occurred in only six member states.
3. Theoretical Predictions
Regulators set the prices of regulated firms by explicitly taking into
account the firm’s capital structure. In the U.S., this practice stems
from the need to ensure regulated firms a “fair rate of return” on
their investments (see, e.g., Spulber, 1989). This fair rate of return
depends, among other things, on the firm’s cost of capital, which in
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turn depends on the firm’s capital structure.7 Under RPI-X regulation
that is widely used in the EU, regulators set price caps that ensure that
the regulated firm’s revenuewill cover its operating costs, depreciation,
and infrastructure renewals charges, and will yield a sufficiently high
return on its capital to induce it to enhance andmaintain its network. As
in the U.S., the return on capital depends on the firm’s capital structure.
The fact that regulated prices are set on the basis of the firm’s
capital structure suggests that regulated firms can affect their prices by
appropriately choosing their capital structure. There are two conflicting
views on the link between capital structure and regulated prices. The
first view starts with the observation that in practice, regulators often
use the firm’s Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) in computing
the firm’s cost of capital that the regulated price is designed to cover.
Taggart (1981, Sec. IIB) then shows that as long the allowed return
on equity exceeds the after-tax imbedded cost of debt, the regulated
firm can induce price increases by substituting equity for debt. The
positive effect of equity financing on the regulated price in turn creates
a strong incentive for regulated firms to use equity financing. It should
be noted, however, that this view is inconsistent with the empirical
evidencementioned in the Introduction that shows that regulated rates-
of-return and prices tend to increase with leverage (Hagerman and
Ratchford, 1978, and Besley and Bolton, 1990) and that firms tend to
increase their leverage in response to regulation (Taggart, 1985, and
Ovtchinnikov, 2008), and it is also inconsistent with the recent concern
in the U.K. and in Italy regarding the “dash for debt” of regulated
utilities.
An alternative view, advanced by Taggart (1981, Sec. IIC), Spiegel
and Spulber (1994 and 1997), and Spiegel (1994 and 1996) is that
regulators are averse to the possibility that the firm they regulated
will become financially distressed and therefore raise prices when the
firm increases its leverage in order to minimize the risk of financial
distress.8 According to this view, regulated firms have a strong incentive
to increase their leverage in order to induce regulators to set high prices.
In a recent document, the Italian Corte Dei Conti (National Audit
7. The Supreme court of the U.S. stated in an early decision from 1898, Smyth v. Ames
(1898) 169 U.S. 466, that “what the company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the
value of thatwhich it employs for thepublic convenience.” In its landmarkdecisionFederal
Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas Co. (1944) 320 U.S. 591, the Supreme court elaborated
on the concept of “fair return” and stated that “the return to the equity owner should be
commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding
risks.”
8. For example, Owen and Braeutigam (1978) argue that “One of the worst fears of a
regulatory agency is the bankruptcy of the firm it supervises, resulting in “instability” of
services to the public or wildly fluctuating prices.”
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Office) expressed a similar opinion and wrote that “Privatized firms
strategically increase the risk of insolvency in order to obtain higher
tariffs to finance investments. The regulated firm uses leverage as a
commitment device vis-a`-vis the regulator to maintain a high level of
profitability.”9 Of course, the strategic effect of leverage on prices begs
the question why regulators do not restrict the leverage of regulated
firms.10 Spiegel (1994, 1996) provides a possible answer to this question
by showing that the increase in regulated prices due to leverage may
lead to more efficient investment choices by the regulated firm.
The above theoretical predictions are based however on the
implicit assumption that the regulated firm is privately owned and
regulated by an IRA. But as mentioned in Section 1, many European
utilities are still state-controlled and in many cases, are still regu-
lated by ministries, governmental committees, or local governments
rather than by an IRA. These institutional features have important
implications.
First, when the state controls the regulated firm, it plays the dual
role of an owner and a regulator. Hence, unlike privately controlled
regulated firms, state-controlled regulated firms do not need to use
their capital structure strategically as a way to induce higher prices.
Second, it is often argued that IRAs have a better ability to make
credible long-term commitments to regulatory policies than ministries
and government agencies (see e.g., Levy and Spiller, 1994, and Gilardi
2002 and 2005). An empirical support for this argument is provided
by Guasch, Laffont, and Straub (2008). They study a sample of 307
transportation and water concession contracts in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, and Mexico over the period 1989 to 2000,11 and find
that although 45% of the transport concession contracts and 71% of
9. See Corte Dei Conti, “Obiettivi E Risultati Delle Operazioni Di Privatizzazione
Di Partecipazioni Pubbliche,” Roma, February 10, 2010, p. 195, available at http://www.
cnim.it/cnimnm/articlefiles/407-Privatizzazioni%20definitivo%20-%20relazione.pdf.
See also p. 219 for a similar statement.
10. In the U.S. regulatory commissions allow regulated firms to exercise discretion in
choosing their capital structures (see Phillips, 1988). For example, the Colorado Supreme
Court in Re Mountain States Teleph. & Teieg. Co. (39 PUR 4th 222, 247–248) stated that “a
guiding principle of utility regulation is that management is to be left free to exercise its
judgment regarding the most appropriate ratio between debt and equity.” As for the EU,
we are not aware of any case in which EU regulators have interfered with the financing
decisions of a privatized regulated firm.
11. A concession is the right to use the assets of a former state company for a limited
period of time (usually 20 to 30 years), being fully responsible for all investments and
having to secure a number of targets specified in the contract. At the end of the concession,
all the assets go back to the government. In a sense then, concessions could be viewed
as limited-term privatizations. Guasch, Laffont, and Straub (2008) report that during
the 1990s concessions have been used in 67% of the private sector participation cases
worldwide, all sectors included.
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the water concession contracts were renegotiated, the presence of an
IRA lowered the probability of renegotiation by 5%–7.3%. This effect
is significant given that the average probability of renegotiation of any
individual contract at any point in time is around 1%. The better ability
of IRAs to make long-term commitments suggests that IRAs are less
likely to cut prices once thefirm’s investment is sunk and therebybenefit
consumers at the expense of the firm’s owners.12 This implies in turn
that privately controlled firms which are subject to regulation by IRAs
anticipate, other things being equal, higher regulated prices and hence
a lower risk of financial distress. As a result, these firms are likely to
issue more debt. In other words, the cost of using debt strategically in
order to induce regulators to raise prices is cheaper when regulators are
independent and hence, regulated firms are expected to have a higher
leverage when facing an independent regulator.13
Taggart (1981) suggests another reason why leverage may be
higher when the firm is regulated by an IRA: he argues that lags or
uncertainties in the regulator’s reaction to the firm’s capital structure
decision weaken the firm’s incentive to manipulate its capital structure
in an attempt to influence the regulated price. As a result, the regulated
firm has a stronger incentive to issue debt when it faces effective
regulatorswhoare expected to respond in an immediate andpredictable
way to changes in the firm’s financing mix.
A third reason why leverage may be higher when the firm is
regulated by an IRA is that when the state acts as a regulator, the firm
may lobby the state directly to obtain more favorable terms and hence
may not have to use leverage strategically in order to achieve the same
goal.
The two hypotheses that we test in this paper are therefore as
follows:
Hypothesis 1: Conditional on the existence of an IRA, privately controlled
regulated firms will have a higher leverage than state-controlled
firms.
12. Henisz and Zelner (2001) study data from 55 countries over 20 years and find
that stronger constraints on executive discretion, which improves their ability to commit
not to expropriate the property of privately owned regulated firms, leads to a faster
deployment of basic telecommunications infrastructure. Li (2009) examines data on 22
mobile carriers from7 countries over the time period 1995–2007 and shows that regulatory
independence is associated with a higher mobile penetration and network expansion,
and greater technical efficiency, TFP growth and innovation. Moreover, this effect is
particularly significant when firms are privately controlled.
13. Cambini and Spiegel (2011) formalize this idea in the context of a theoreticalmodel
that explicitly accounts for partial ownership of the regulated firm by the state and for the
regulator’s ability to make long-term commitments. They show that the regulated price
is an increasing function of the firm’s debt level, but the value of this function is higher
in the presence of an IRA. As a result the cost of issuing debt is lower for firms that face
an IRA and hence these firms end up having a higher leverage.
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Hypothesis 2: An increase (decrease) in leverage leads to an increase (decrease)
in regulated prices provided that the firm is privately controlled
and regulated by an IRA.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 exploit the heterogeneity in our sample
across ownership structures (private vs. state control) and regulatory
frameworks (independent vs. non independent regulatory agencies)
to examine the strategic interaction between regulation and capital
structure.
4. Data and Main Variables
Using Worldscope, we identify publicly traded firms operating in
regulated sectors during the period 1994–2005 in the EU-15 member
states. We define regulated sectors to be those in which entry and
prices are subject to regulatory oversight either by the state or by
an IRA. These sectors include electricity, natural gas, water supply,
telecommunications, freight roads concessions, ports, and airports.
Excluded from the sample are airlines, oil and refinery companies, and
companies operating exclusively in wireless telecommunications or in
electricity generation because the prices of these services are typically
not regulated.
By applying these selection criteria,we endupwith anunbalanced
panel of 92 publicly traded utilities and transportation infrastructure
operators. In all, we have 44 firms that engage in electricity and gas
distribution, 13 water supply companies, 15 telecoms (mainly vertically
integratedoperators), 8 freight roads concessionaires, and12 transporta-
tion infrastructure operators (airport, ports, and docks). Appendix B
lists the firms in our sample and provides relevant information on each
firm. Table II provides summary statistics for the main variables we use
in the econometric analysis.
As mentioned above, our main objective is to find out if and
how capital structure and regulated prices are affected by regulatory
independence and by firm ownership. In the rest of this section we
describe in detail how we constructed our main dependent variables
(leverage and regulated prices) and our main explanatory variables
(regulation and ownership). Apart from these variables we also use in
our regression analysis in Section 5 various firm level controls that we
will described below in the relevant regressions in which they are used.
4.1 Leverage and Regulated Prices
To test our theoretical predictions, it is important for us to use ameasure
of leverage that captures the risk of default because the theory suggests
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Table II.
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. Obs.
Panel A: Full sample 1994–2005
Market Leverage 0.181 0.168 0 0.881 765
Book Leverage 0.272 0.215 0 1 889
Real Total Asset (in
millions of 2005 dollars)
20,245 32,951 30 205,179 891
Real Sales (in millions of
2005 dollars)
9,262 14,750 4 80,226 891
Tangibility 0.622 0.210 0.034 0.967 890
EBIT-to-Total Asset 0.074 0.099 −1.948 0.299 871
Market-to-Book 1.416 0.736 0.572 14.176 767
Nondebt Tax Shield 0.052 0.03 0 0.183 891
State’s UCR 0.348 0.359 0 1 891
Panel B: Privately controlled utilities (50%)
Market Leverage 0.191 0.175 0 0.881 537
Book Leverage 0.287 0.222 0 1 552
Real Total Assets (in
millions of 2005
dollars)
20,335 28,227 41 156,216 552
Real Sales (in millions of
2005 dollars)
10,083 14,757 4 75,287 552
Tangibility 0.620 0.225 0.034 0.967 551
EBIT-to-Total Asset 0.075 0.104 −1.948 0.293 546
Market-to-Book 1.388 0.575 0.664 9.675 537
Nondebt Tax Shield 0.048 0.029 0.003 0.183 552
State’s UCR 0.10 0.15 0 0.499 552
Panel C: State-controlled utilities
Market Leverage 0.156 0.150 0 0.757 228
Book Leverage 0.246 0.202 0 1 337
Real Total Assets (in
millions of 2005
dollars)
20,097 39,450 30 205,179 339
Real Sales (in millions of
2005 dollars)
7,924 14,640 8 80,266 339
Tangibility 0.625 0.184 0.068 0.962 339
EBIT-to-Total Asset 0.071 0.090 −0.975 0.299 325
Market-to-Book 1.482 1.015 0.572 14.177 230
Nondebt Tax Shield 0.058 0.031 0 0.161 339
State’s UCR 0.751 0.196 0.5 1 339
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that leverage induces regulators to raise prices in order to minimize
the risk of costly financial distress. Therefore, in most of the analysis,
our measure of leverage will be market leverage that is defined as total
financial debt (both long- and short-term) in book values divided by the
sum of total financial debt and the market value of equity.14 The latter
is computed by multiplying the number of outstanding shares at the
end of the relevant year by the share price at that date converted into
U.S. dollars. It should be emphasized that market leverage can increase
(decrease) either because the face value of debt increases (decreases) or
because the market value of equity decreases (increases). We believe
however that in both cases, the firm becomes more vulnerable to
financial distress and hence regulators may be forced to raise regulated
prices. In some of our analysis we will also use the book value of
leverage, that is, the total financial debt divided by the sum of total
financial debt and the book value of equity, as an alternative a measure
of leverage to check the robustness of the results.
Accounting and financial market data have been collected from
Worldscope. Table II shows that the mean market leverage in our sample
is 18.1%,whilemean book leverage is 27.2%.Moreover, market leverage
is higher for privately controlled firms than for state-controlled firms
(19.1% vs. 15.6%). Table II reveals a large variability in the debt ratios:
market leverage (D/(D + ME)) ranges from 0 to 88%, while book
leveragemay be as large as 100%.15 Unreported statistics at the industry
level shows that on average, the most highly leveraged firms in our
sample are electric utilities with a mean market leverage of 22.8%,
followed by multiutilities, 19.2%, and telecoms with a mean market
leverage of 17.4%. The least leveraged are airports with a mean market
leverage of 5.5%, and ports and docks with a mean market leverage
of 8.4%.
To test Hypothesis 2, we need data on regulated prices. Unfortu-
nately, we were unable to find reliable data on regulated retail prices
at the individual firm level. Instead, we collected country- and sector-
specific retail price indices (see Appendix A for the sources).16 All price
indices are in constant 2005 prices.Webelieve that given that there is still
limited competition in the utilities sectors and given that there is little
14. See Rajan and Zingales (1995) for a discussion of alternative leverage measures.
Notice that ideally,market leveragewouldalso include themarket valueofdebt.However,
because debt is not always publicly traded, we were unable to find reliable data on the
market value of debt. For this reason we also cannot include bond ratings as a control
variable in our regression analysis.
15. Only 2firms in ourdata have zero leverage:Aereoporti di Firenze andThessaloniki
Water, both are state-controlled.
16. Wewere unable however to find price indices for airports, ports, and docks, whose
services are considered to be intermediate rather than final services.
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price dispersion, these price indices appropriately reflect the relevant
prices for the firms in our sample.17
4.2 Regulation
In order to study the effect of regulatory independenceon the interaction
between capital structure and regulated prices, we constructed an IRA
dummy that is equal to 1 in all years in which the firm was subject
to regulation by an IRA and equals 0 otherwise, that is when the firm
is subject to regulatory oversight by the state or by local governments.
Hence, for each sector/country in our dataset, the IRAdummy switches
from 0 to 1 in the year when the IRA was set up. The IRA dummy
was constructed using the inception dates collected by Gilardi (2002)
for the energy and telecommunications sectors in which IRAs already
exist in all countries in our sample. We complemented this data by
drawing from additional sources for freight roads, airports, port and
docks, and water. As described in Section 2, except for the water and
railway industries in the UK, in all other member states IRAs were not
in place in the water and transportation sectors.
4.3 Ownership
In most of our analysis, we define firms as “privately controlled” if
the state holds less than 50% of the control rights (otherwise the firm
is “state-controlled”) and define the year of privatization as the year in
which the state’s control rights dropped below 50% for the first time.We
also examine the robustness of the results by using a more restrictive
definition of private control, whereby firms are defined as “privately
controlled” if the state holds less than 30% of the firm’s control rights
instead of 50% (i.e., private investors hold at least 70% of the control
rights). Because our sample often exhibits a complex web of cross-
ownership patterns among firms (one firm holds the shares of another
firm, which in turn holds the shares of a third firm—see Figure 1 for an
example), the statemay hold both direct aswell as indirect control rights
in firms. In order to measure the state’s ultimate control rights (UCR),
we use the weakest link approach (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang
(2002), and Bortolotti and Faccio (2008)). According to this approach,
17. Although the telecommunication sector in the EUwas gradually deregulated over
time, complete deregulation was present during our sample period only in Finland. As
of the end of 2005, price regulation in the form of price caps or some other form of tariff
approval was widely applied in the EU, especially for basic voice services (see OECD
2006, Table IX).
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the UCR of a given investor (the state in our case) is simply equal to the
minimum ownership stake along a chain (i.e., the weakest link). In the
case of multiple chains, the UCR’s are summed up across all chains.18
The sources used to compute the state’s UCR are listed in
Appendix A.19
Among the 92firms in our sample, 43firms areprivately controlled
throughout our sample, 25 are state-controlled throughout our sample
period, and 24 were privatized during our sample period and hence
we observe them before and after their privatization.20 Table II shows
that the mean UCR of the state (including both central and local gov-
ernments, ministries, and various branches of public administration) in
the firms in our sample is 34.8% for the entire sample, 10% for privately
controlled firms, and 75.1% for state-controlled firms. In terms of size,
the mean total assets of firms in our sample are slightly over 20 billion
dollars (in constant 2005 prices) and this figure is similar for privately
and state-controlled firms. The mean annual sales (in constant price
2005) are 10,083 million dollars for privately controlled firms and 7,924
million dollars for state-controlled firms.
Our definition of private control may be overstated due to the
presence of “golden shares,” which give the state special control rights
in the firm, including the right to appoint board members, the right
to veto proposed acquisitions, and the right to cap the share of voting
rights that individual shareholders can own. Our sample includes 11
firms with golden shares (see Table II). Of these firms, 4 are telecoms,
4 are electric utilities, 2 are natural gas utilities, and 1 is an airport. In
practically all cases, golden shares are present only when the firm is
privately controlled.
5. Empirical Results
Our main goal is to test Hypotheses 1–2 stated in Section 3. In the
following subsections we examine these hypotheses in turn.
18. To illustrate, suppose that an investor has an ownership stake of 50% in firm A
and 30% in firm B. Firm A in turn has a 30% ownership stake in firm C, while firm B has
a 10% ownership stake in firm C. Then, the investor’s UCR in firm C is equal to min (50,
30) + min (30, 10) = 40.
19. In some cases, firms in our data have shares with multiple voting rights, although
as of May 1998, such shares were outlawed in Italy, Spain, the U.K., and Germany.
Unfortunately, our data sources do not report the identity of the owners of these shares
and hence we must treat them as ordinary shares. As a result, our data on state’s UCR
may be biased downward.
20. To the best of our knowledge, none of the 25 firms in our sample that were still
state-controlled by the end of 2005 was privatized in 2006–2009.
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Table III.
Mean Market Leverage by Ownership and
Regulation Types
Total IRA does Regulation
Observations IRA Exists not Exist Difference
N = 765 N = 464 N = 301 p-value
Panel A: Mean market leverage 1994–2005 (50% control threshold)
Total observations 19.9% 15.2% 4.7%
(0.8%) (0.9%) p = 0.0001
Privately controlled 19.1% 20.7% 16.4% 4.3%
(0.7%) (0.9%) (1.1%) p = 0.004
N = 537 N = 333 N = 204
State-controlled 15.6% 17.8% 12.7% 5.1%
(0.9%) (1.2%) (1.5%) p = 0.010
N = 228 N = 131 N = 97
Ownership difference 3.4% 2.9% 3.6%
p-value p = 0.009 p = 0.103 p = 0.058
Panel B: Mean market leverage 1994–2005 (30% control threshold)
Total observations 19.9% 15.2% 4.7%
(0.8%) (0.9%) p = 0.0001
Privately controlled 19.4% 21.0% 16.6% 4.4%
(0.8%) (1.1%) (1.3%) p = 0.0131
N = 434 N = 279 N = 155
State-controlled 16.3% 18.2% 13.7% 4.5%
(0.8%) (1.1%) (1.2%) p = 0.006
N = 331 N = 185 N = 146
Ownership difference 3.1% 2.8% 2.85%
p-value p = 0.009 p = 0.086 p = 0.115
Market Leverage is total financial debt divided by the sum of total financial debt and the market value of equity. The
latter is based on the price and number of outstanding shares at the end of the relevant year in U.S. dollars. Firms are
defined “privately controlled” if the state’s UCR does not exceed 50% (Panels A and C) or 30% (Panels B and D) and
are defined as “state-controlled” otherwise. (Standard errors are in parenthesis). The p-values are based on two-sided
test of the Null hypothesis that the difference in the average leverage between two different groups is equal to 0.
5.1 Leverage
In total, we have 765 firm-year observations on market leverage (in the
regression analysis below, the sample size is lower due to missing data
in some control variables). We begin by dividing these observations
into four groups, depending on whether firms are privately- or state-
controlled and whether they are regulated by an IRA or by some
branch of the government. In Table III we report the mean leverage
of each group. Panel A shows that irrespective of whether an IRA
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exists, the mean market leverage of regulated firms is significantly
higher if they are privately controlled, and irrespective of owner-
ship, the mean leverage is higher when an IRA exists. Panel B of
Table III shows that these results continue to hold when we use a
more stringent definition of private-control (i.e., firms are defined as
privately controlled only if the state’s UCR are 30% or less rather
than 50% or less). Overall, Table III shows that the mean market
leverage of firms is particularly high when they are privately controlled
and subject to regulation by an IRA (20.7% in Panel A and 21% in
Panel B) and is particularly low when they are state-controlled and
not subject to regulation by an IRA (12.7% in Panel A and 13.7% in
Panel B).
The preliminary results in Table III suggest that both the own-
ership structure and the existence of an IRA matter for the financial
structure of regulated firms. In particular, leverage tends to be higher
when firms are privately controlled and when an IRA exists. Of course,
these results are only suggestive becauseweare yet to control for various
possible alternative determinants of capital structure. We therefore turn
now to a regression analysis.
Our core specification is the following:
Lit = α0 + α1Private Controlit + α2IRAit + α3Private Controlit × IRAit
+α4Xit+α5Yit+
∑
n
μinCountryn+
∑
j
ρi j Sector j+
∑
t
λtYeart+εi t,
(1)
where Lit is the Market Leverage of firm i in year t, Private Controlit is
a dummy that is equal to 1 if firm i was privately controlled in year
t and is equal to 0 otherwise, IRAit is a dummy that is equal to 1 if
firm i was subject to regulation by an IRA in year t and is equal to
0 otherwise, Xit is a vector of firm-specific variables, Yit is a vector of
country-specific variables, Country, Sector, and Year are country, sector,
and year dummies, and εit is an error term.
The vector Xit of firm-specific variables includes various firm
characteristics that were shown in the empirical corporate finance
literature to be reliable determinants of capital structure.21 Our main
goal is to find out if ownership structure and regulatory independence
have a significant effect on leverage (as we show in Table III) even
after controlling for these alternative potential determinants of capital
structure. Specifically, the vector Xit includes the log of real total assets
to control for firm’s size (size is typically shown to have a positive effect
21. For common firm characteristics that are included in leverage regressions see for
example, Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002),
and Frank and Goyal (2007).
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of leverage), the ratio of fixed to total assets that reflects asset tangibility
(tangible assets can serve a collateral and hence lower the cost of debt
financing), the ratio of EBIT (earnings before interests and taxes) to total
assets that is a proxy for profitability and “efficiency,” (more efficient
firms are likely to have higher earnings with the same assets), and the
ratio of depreciation and amortization to total assets as a proxy for
nondebt tax shields (tax deductions for depreciations are substitutes for
the tax benefits of debt financing).
Given that our sample covers firms from 14 different countries
over a period of 12 years, we include in the regression a vector Yit
of time-varying country-specific variables that includes GDP Growth
to account for differences in macroeconomic conditions over time, a
Political Orientation index that measures the political orientation of the
government, and an Investor Protection index that measures the legal
protection of shareholders’ rights (the latter two indices appear in only
some of our specifications). The Political Orientation index ranges from
0 (extreme left wing) to 10 (extreme right wing) and is computed as
the weighted average of the right-left political orientation scores of the
parties forming the executive branch of government, where the weights
are equal to the number of parliamentary seats held by each party
divided by the total number of parliamentary seats held by the ruling
coalition as a whole (see Huber and Inglehart, 1995, and Bortolotti and
Faccio, 2008).We expect higher values of thePolitical Orientation index to
be associated with more pro-firm regulation (this is true even when an
IRA exists although naturally to a lesser extent). The Investor Protection
index we use is the “anti-director rights” index developed by La Porta
et al. (1998) and updated by Pagano and Volpin (2005). We expect that
higher values of this indexwould be associatedwith lower cost of equity
and hence lower leverage.
The regulatory and institutional environment in our sample may
differ across sectors, across countries, and over time. Oneway to control
for unobserved characteristics of the regulatory and institutional envi-
ronment (like the effectiveness of the regulatory rules, the regulatory
climate, the internal organization of the regulatory body, etc.) is to
include country and sector dummies. Unfortunately, time invariant
country- and sector-specific dummies cannot be estimated by the fixed
effects model because they are perfectly collinear with the firm fixed
effects. Therefore, we often rely on random effect estimation that allows
us to include country- and sector-specific dummies and which is more
efficient. This approach is valid however only when the firm-specific
effect included in the error term is not correlated with the regressors. To
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ensure that this is the case,weperform theHausman (1978) specification
test and report the associated p-values along with the results.22
Our main interest in the leverage regressions is with the effects of
ownership and regulatory independence on leverage; these effects are
captured by thePrivate Control, IRA, andPrivate Control× IRAdummies.
The following table conveniently summarizes the value of the intercept
in equation (1), depending on the firm’s ownership and regulatory
structures and the ownership effect controlling for the existence of IRA
as well as the IRA effect controlling for ownership type.
IRA No IRA IRA effect
Privately controlled α0 + α1 + α2 + α3 α0 + α1 α2 + α3
State-controlled α0 + α2 α0 α2
Ownership effect α1 + α3 α1
From the table it is clear that the sum of the coefficients of the
Private Control and the Private Control× IRA dummies, α1 + α3, captures
the effect of ownership (private- vs. state-control) on the leverage of
firms that are regulated by an IRA, while the coefficient of the Private
Control dummy, α1, captures the effect of ownership on the leverage
of firms that are not regulated by an IRA. Likewise, the sum of the
IRA and the Private Control × IRA dummies, α2 + α3, captures the
effect of regulatory independence (IRA vs. no IRA) on the leverage
of privately controlled firms, while the coefficient of the IRA dummy,
α2, captures the effect of regulatory independence on the leverage of
state-controlled firms. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the sum of α1 + α3 is
positive and significant. Apart from this prediction it is also interesting
to examine the effect, if any, that IRA has on the leverage of privately
controlled firms. In the regression below we will therefore report the
p-values associated with the tests on the significance of α1 + α3 and α2
+ α3.
Table IV tests our baseline specifications, using alternative esti-
mation techniques. Columns (1) and (2) report estimation results using
OLS on pooled data. A full set of time dummies is included in all
columns. In Column (2) we add country and sector dummies and
also interact these dummies to allow the sector effects to vary across
different countries. In Column (3) we report fixed effect estimates that
allow us to control for firm-specific fixed effects, but not for unobserved
22. If our model is correctly specified, and if the firm fixed effect is uncorrelated with
the explanatory variables, then the (subset) of coefficients that are estimated by the fixed
effects estimator and by the random effects estimators should not statistically differ.
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country- and sector-effects. In Column (4) we turn to random effects
estimation that allows us to include the country and sector dummies in
the estimation. In Columns (5) and (6) we examine the robustness of the
results by replacing the Private Control dummywith themore restrictive
Private Control_30 dummy. Note that the Wald tests of the country and
sector dummies in Columns (4) and (6) indicate that both dummies
are jointly significant (and hence should be included in the regression),
while the Hausman specification test indicates that the random effects
model is valid. We therefore believe that the random effects model is
more appropriate than the fixed effectsmodel (wherewe cannot include
country- and sector-specific dummies).
The estimates in Table IV are very similar across all specifications.
The various firm-specific controls are significant and their signs are
generally consistent with earlier empirical studies on the determinants
of capital structure (see e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The only
exception is the negative and significant coefficient on fixed-to-total
assets, which is our proxy for tangibility. Earlier studies typically find
that tangibility has a positive effect on leverage, the logic being that
tangible assets can serve as a collateral and hence lower the cost of
debt financing. In our sample, however, fixed assets are highly firm-
specific and nonredeployable (e.g., roads, airports, physical electricity
or telecommunications networks) and may therefore serve as poor
collaterals.23
More importantly for us, the sum of the Private Control and Private
Control × IRA dummies (α1+α3) is positive and mostly significant; the
only exceptions are in Columns (3) and (5) where we use fixed effects
estimates (recall though that in these regressions we cannot include
country- and sector-specific dummies). These results hold both when
we use the Private Control dummy (Columns (1)–(4)), as well as when
we use themore restrictive Private Control_30 dummy (Columns (5) and
(6)).24 The findings then provide empirical support for Hypothesis 1
23. Estimating the leverage regressions separately for the subsamples of telecoms,
electric utilities, and energy utilities (electricity andnatural gas),water, and transportation
infrastructures (freight roads, ports, and airports), reveals that the significant negative
coefficient on tangibility is due to telecoms; the coefficient is not significant for other
sectors and is even positive (though not significant) for electric utilities.
24. We tested the robustness of the Private Control_30 × IRA coefficient in Columns
(3)–(6) to the clustering of observations by regulatory agencies (i.e., all firms regulated by
the same agency are in the same cluster), and by countries (all firms that belong to the
same country are in the same cluster) rather than by firms, as we do in Table IV.We found
that when we cluster by regulatory agencies the interacted dummy remains significant
in Columns (3) and (4), and when we cluster by countries, the Private Control_30 × IRA
dummy is significant in Columns (4)–(6). In addition, because there are some firm-year
observationswhere theMarket Leverage is zero, we also tested the baseline specification on
the sub-sample of utilities with strictly positive Market Leverage. The resulting coefficient
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and suggest that when an IRA exists, privately controlled firms have
significantly higher leverage than state-controlled firms. On the other
hand, the Private Control dummy itself is never significant (this is also
true in Tables V–VII below), so absent an IRA, the leverage of privately
controlled firms is not significantly different than the leverage of state-
controlled firms.
Table IV also shows that the sum of the IRA and Private Control ×
IRA dummies (α2 + α3) is not significant: in and of itself, the existence
of an IRA does not have a significant effect on the leverage of privately
controlled regulated firms. By contrast, the IRA dummy is negative and
in some cases significant; this provides weak support for the hypothesis
that state-controlled firms have a lower leverage in the presence of an
IRA. Table VII below shows that this is mainly due to firms that were
state-controlled throughout our sample.
In Table V we add the Political Orientation and Investor Protection
variables to our core specification to control for institutional factors.25
Columns (1) and (2) use the Private Control dummy, while Columns (3)
and (4) use the more restrictive Private Control_30 dummy. Columns (1)
and (3) show that the Political Orientation variable, which reflects how
right wing the government is, is negative and significant under both
definitions of private control. If we think of right-wing governments as
being more pro-firm, then this result suggests that firms facing more
pro-firm governments do not need to rely on high leverage to obtain
favorable regulatory outcomes as much as firms facing pro-consumer
governments.On the other hand,Columns (2) and (4) show, as expected,
that stronger investor protection is associated with lower leverage,
presumably because it lowers the cost of equity financing. Like Table IV,
the results in Table V also provide empirical support for Hypothesis 1
as the sum of the Private control and Private control × IRA dummies
(α1 + α3) is once again positive and significant across all specifications.
Moreover, in Columns (1) and (3), the sum of the IRA and Private control
× IRA dummies (α2 + α3) is positive and significant. This suggests that
once we control for investor protection, privately controlled firms have
significantly higher leverage when they are subject to regulation by an
IRA.
One might argue that the results in Table V are at least partly
driven by exogenous fluctuations in equity markets which affect the
on the Private Control × IRA dummy is 0.081(the p-value is 0.02) and the coefficient on the
Private Control_30 × IRA dummy is 0.064 (the p-value is 0.04).
25. We do not include the two variables in the same regression because then the
Hausman specification test rejects the random effects model. As mentioned above, we
prefer to use the random effects model because we cannot include country- and sector-
specific dummies in fixed effects estimation.
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Table V.
Leverage, Regulation, Ownership and
Institutional Environment
Market Leverage (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of real total assets 0.033
∗ ∗ ∗
0.034
∗ ∗ ∗
0.032
∗ ∗ ∗
0.032
∗ ∗ ∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Fixed-to-total assets −0.131∗ ∗ −0.105∗ ∗ −0.122∗ ∗ −0.094∗
(0.052) (0.051) (0.055) (0.054)
EBIT-to-total assets −0.317∗ ∗ ∗ −0.315∗ ∗ ∗ −0.326∗ ∗ ∗ −0.322∗ ∗ ∗
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Nondebt tax shield −1.259∗ ∗ ∗ −1.284∗ ∗ ∗ −1.272∗ ∗ ∗ −1.302∗ ∗ ∗
(0.374) (0.329) (0.378) (0.329)
GDP growth −0.029∗ ∗ ∗ −0.032∗ ∗ ∗ −0.029∗ ∗ ∗ −0.032∗ ∗ ∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Political orientation −0.015∗ ∗ – −0.014∗ ∗ –
(0.007) – (0.007) –
Investor protection – −0.036∗ ∗ – −0.036∗ ∗
– (0.016) – (0.015)
Private Control (α1) 0.002 0.001 – –
(0.028) (0.028) – –
Private Control_30 (α1) – – −0.011 0.012
– – (0.026) (0.024)
IRA (α2) −0.028 −0.044 −0.013 −0.030
(0.038) (0.036) (0.033) (0.029)
Private Control × IRA (α3) 0.067∗ ∗ 0.056∗ – –
(0.033) (0.033) – –
Private Control_30 × IRA (α3) – – 0.051∗ 0.043a
(0.030) (0.030)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value test on α1 + α3 = 0 0.035 0.074 0.046 0.069
P-value test on α2 + α3 = 0 0.094 0.564 0.096 0.577
R2 within 0.269 0.279 0.266 0.277
Wald-test χ2 (p-value) 1144.25 (0.00) 770.25 (0.00) 1248.14 (0.00) 856.45 (0.00)
Hausman test χ2 (p-value) 18.31 (0.502) 14.38 (0.811) 19.90 (0.464) 95.97 (0.00)
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 92 [755] 92 [755] 92 [755] 92 [755]
aThe p value is equal to 0.154.
The dependent variable is Market Leverage; it is defined as in Table III. Private control_30 is a dummy equal to 1 when
the state’s UCR are below 30%. Political Orientation ranges from 0 (extreme left wing) to 10 (extreme right wing) and
is equal to a weighted average of scores given in expert surveys supporting government (see Huber and Inglehart,
1995, and Bortolotti and Faccio, 2008). Investor Protection is the time-varying “antidirector rights” index by Pagano and
Volpin (2005). All regressions include year, sector and country dummies. Random-effects estimates. Standard errors
in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation (observations are clustered by
firms). The Wald χ2 tests the null of that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero. The Hausman χ2 tests the null of
nonsystematic differences of the fixed and random effects model. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table VI.
Robustness: Book Leverage Regressions
Book Leverage (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of real total assets 0.035∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Fixed-to-total assets −0.264∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ −0.260∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.076) (0.075) (0.076)
EBIT-to-total assets −0.332∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗ −0.327∗∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.097)
Nondebt tax shield −0.900∗∗ −0.936∗∗ −0.951∗∗ −0.887∗∗
(0.453) (0.450) (0.430) (0.454)
GDP growth −0.021∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.021∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Political orientation – −0.012∗ – –
– (0.07) – –
Investor protection – – −0.018 –
– – (0.013) –
Private control (α1) −0.047 −0.034 −0.038 –
(0.031) (0.032) (0.033) –
Private control_30 (α1) – – – −0.052
– – – (0.034)
IRA (α2) −0.102∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.030)
Private control × IRA (α3) 0.115∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ –
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) –
Private control_30 × IRA (α3) – – – 0.126∗∗∗
– – – (0.037)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value test on α1 + α3 = 0 0.052 0.021 0.045 0.013
P-value test on α2 + α3 = 0 0.648 0.312 0.731 0.282
R2 within 0.201 0.208 0.206 0.201
Wald-test χ2 (p-value) 906.21 (0.00) 1210.2 (0.00) 995.71 (0.00) 933.78 (0.00)
Hausman test χ2 (p-value) 0.93 (1.000) 7.44 (0.995) 12.90 (0.882) 6.12 (0.998)
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 92 [869] 92 [869] 92 [869] 92 [869]
The dependent variable is Book Leverage, which is total financial debt divided by the sum of total financial debt and the
book value of equity. The explanatory variables are defined similarly to Table IV. All regressions include year, sector,
and country dummies. Random-effects estimates. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and
to within group serial correlation (observations are clustered by firms). TheWald χ2 tests the null of that all coefficients
are jointly equal to zero. The Hausman χ2 tests the null of nonsystematic differences of the fixed and random effects
model. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
market leverage of firms for reasons that have nothing to do with
our hypotheses. To address this concern, we re-estimate our core
specification in Table VI, using Book Leverage (the ratio between total
financial debt and the sum of total financial debt and the book value of
equity) as our measure of leverage. The sample size is now larger than
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in Tables IV andV becausewe havemore observations on book leverage
than on market leverage. As one can see, the results are very similar to
those in Tables IV and V. In particular, the sum of the Private control
and Private control × IRA dummies (α1 + α3) is once again positive and
significant across all estimations. It therefore appears that the positive
effect of private-control on the leverage of firms that are regulated by
an IRA is robust to the measure of leverage that we use.26
In Table VII we look more closely at the effect of ownership
on leverage. To this end, we separate the firms in our sample into
two subsamples. Columns (1)–(3) examine firms that were privatized
during our sample period (i.e., the government’s UCR in the firm
dropped below 50% during our sample period). Here, the Private
control dummy captures the difference in leverage before and after
privatization. Column (4) examines, separately, firms that stayed either
privately- or state-controlled throughout our sample period (i.e., the
government’s UCR in the firm remained either below or above 50%
throughout our sample period). This allows us to estimate the impact
of IRA after controlling for the effect of ownership on leverage through
other regressors.
Column (1) in Table VII shows that, in and of itself, privatization
does not have a significant effect on the leverage of regulated firms,
but regulatory independence does: the coefficient of the Private Control
dummy is not significant while the coefficient of the IRA dummy is
positive and significant.27 Column (2) adds the Private Control × IRA
dummy and shows that neither the Private Control dummy nor the sum
of the Private Control and the Private Control × IRA dummies (α1 + α3)
are significant.28 On the other hand, the sum of the IRA and Private
Control × IRA dummies (α2 + α3) is positive and significant, indicating
that the leverage of privatized firms is significantly larger when they
are subject to regulation by an IRA.29
26. To further control for equity market fluctuations, we also added to the regression
country-specific stock market indices. These indices however had no significant effect on
our results.
27. If we add Private Control and IRA separately, the results do not change: Private
Control remains insignificant even if the absence of the IRA dummy, while IRA remains
significant even after the Private Control dummy is removed (its coefficient equals 0.079
with a p-value of 0.08).
28. We also added a Privatization Year dummy that is equal to 1 in the year of
privatization and is equal to 0 in all other years, but this dummy was not significant.
29. The lack of a privatization effect on leverage is in contrast to Dewenter and
Malatesta (2001), Megginson, Nash, and Van Radenborgh (1994), and D’Souza and
Megginson (1999). They study privatizations in different countries, sectors, and time
periods, and show that in most cases, firms lower their leverage following privatization
and this decrease can often be substantial. Unlike our paper, though, these papers do not
focus on regulated firms. Moreover, many of the regulated utilities in their samples were
not regulated by IRAs.
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As mentioned in Section 4.2, 11 privately controlled firms in our
sample have golden shares that give the state special control rights.
Firms with golden shares may not act like private firms even if the
government’s UCR is small. In Column (3) in Table VII we control for
the existence of golden share by includingGolden Share andGolden Share
× IRA dummies in the regression (the Golden Share dummy is equal to
1 in all years in which the firm had golden shares and is equal to 0
otherwise). Once the Golden Share and Golden Share × IRA dummies
are included in the regression, the value of the intercept in equation (1),
depending on thefirm’s ownership and regulatory structures, becomes
IRA No IRA IRA effect
Privately controlled without
golden shares
α0 +α1 +α2 +α3 α0 +α1 α2 +α3
Privately controlled with
golden shares
α0 +α1 +α2 +α3 +α4 +α5 α0 +α1 +α4 α2 +α3 +α5
State-controlled α0 +α2 α0 α2
Ownership effect without
golden shares
α1 +α3 α1
Ownership effect with
golden shares
α1 +α3 +α4 +α5 α1 +α4
Golden shares effect for
Privately controlled firms
α4 +α5 α4
For example, the value of α1 + α3 captures the effect of private-
control without golden shares if an IRA exists and the value of α1
captures the effect if an IRA does not exist.
The results are very similar to those in Column (1) of Table VII:
privatization still does not have a significant effect on leverage irre-
spective of whether firms have golden shares or not and whether or
not an IRA exists (both α1, α1 + α3 , α1 + α4, and α1 + α3 + α4 + α5
are not significant). As in Column (1), the existence of IRA does have a
positive and significant effect on leverage, but only if firms are privately
controlled and do not have golden shares or if they are state-controlled
(α2 + α3 and α2 are positive and significant). When firms are privately
controlled andhave golden shares, IRAdoes not have a significant effect
on the leverage. The results also show that in and of themselves, golden
shares do not have a significant effect on leverage as both α4 and α4 +
α5 are not significant.
Column (4) in Table VII examines the differences between firms
that stayed privately- or state-controlled throughout our sample period
(i.e., were not involved in a “privatization” process). The results show
that there are several important differences between firms that are
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privately- or state-controlled throughout our sample period. First,
tangibility (Fixed-to-Total Assets) has a significantly negative coefficient
for privately controlled firms, but not for state-controlled firms; this
difference is probably due to the fact that telecoms are heavily rep-
resented in the group of privately controlled firms (see Footnote 23
above). Second, the measure of profitability (EBIT-to-Total Assets) has
a significant negative effect in the case of privately controlled firms,
which is consistent with the typical findings in the empirical corporate
finance literature, but has a significant positive effect in the case of state-
controlled firms. Third, theGDP Growth coefficient is significant only in
the case of state-controlled firms, but not in the case of privately con-
trolled firms. Fourth, the Political Orientation variable is not significant
in the case of state-controlled firms, but is negative and significant in
the case of privately controlled firms. Because an increase in the Political
Orientation variable indicates that the government is more right-wing
and hence likely to be more pro-firm, the latter result suggests that
when privately controlled firms face a more pro-firm government, they
do not need to rely on high leverage to obtain favorable regulatory
outcomes. The fact that the leverage of state-controlled firms is not
affected by the political orientation variable is consistent with the
theory because state-controlled firms do not need to issue debt to shield
themselves from regulatory opportunism. Finally, the IRA variable is
positive and significant in the case of privately controlled firms, which
is consistent with Hypothesis 1, and is negative and highly significant
in the case of state-controlled firms. The latter result, together with
the fact that Column (1) shows that the IRA variable is positive in the
case of privatized firms, suggests that the negative coefficient of the
IRA variable in Table IV is driven by firms that were state-controlled
throughout our sample.
5.2 Leverage and Regulated Prices
Next, we consider Hypothesis 2, which states that higher leverage
induces regulators to raise regulated prices provided that the firm is
privately controlled. When the firm is state-controlled, the state plays a
dual role of an owner and a regulator and hence the firm does not need
to use its leverage as a way to induce higher regulated prices.
To test Hypothesis 2, we apply the Granger (1969) and Sims (1972)
causality tests to examine whether leverage Granger-causes regulated
prices. That is, we examine whether an increase in leverage is followed
by an increase in regulated prices, but not vice versa.30 There are
30. See Arellano (2003, Ch. 6) for details regarding the use Granger causality tests in
the context of a panel setting and an application to panel data with a relatively short
time horizon from 1983 to 1990 (our panel data covers a longer period: 1994–2005).
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three alternative possibilities. First, if regulators can make a long-term
commitment to regulated prices, then regulated prices will determine
the firm’s revenues (up to some exogenous demand shocks), and the
firm in turn would adjust its capital structure to match its expected
revenue stream. In that case, regulated prices would Granger-cause
leverage. Second, it could be that leverage and regulated prices are
correlated but neither one Granger causes the other; rather the two
variables are correlated with a third variable that causes both of them.
A third possibility is that leverage and regulated prices are simply not
correlated with one another.
Weperform theGranger tests by estimating the followingbivariate
VAR(2) model for sector- and country-specific retail price indices and
leverage:
Pit = αPt−1Pi,t−1 + αPt−2Pi,t−2 + β Pt−1Li,t−1 + β Pt−2Li,t−2
+
∑
i
μPi Firmi +
∑
t
λPt Yeart + εPit , (2)
Lit = αLt−1Pi,t−1 + αLt−2Pi,t−2 + βLt−1Li,t−1 + βLt−2Li,t−2
+
∑
i
μLi Firmi +
∑
t
λLt Yeart + εLit, (3)
where Pit and Lit are the regulated price and market leverage of firm i
in period t, Firmi and Yeart are firm and year dummies, and εPit and
εLit are error terms. Our hypothesis that, conditional on individual
and time effects, leverage Granger-causes regulated prices, but not vice
versa, requires that β Pt−1 and β
P
t−2 are positive and significant, while α
L
t−1
and αLt−2 are not significant. Moreover, it requires that Li,t−1 and Li,t−2
contribute significantly to the explanatory power of regression (2),while
Pi,t−1 and Pi,t−2 do not contribute significantly to the explanatory power
of equation (3). We expect these results to hold in the case of privately
controlled firms, but not in the case of state-controlled firms.
Amain concernwhen estimating a dynamicmodel as in equations
(2) and (3) is that the lagged dependent variables are endogenous to the
Granger causality tests were recently used in a similar context to study the causal
relationship between the intensity of product market regulation (reflected by various
indicators of barriers to entry, state ownership, market share of entrants, and price
controls), and investments in 21 OECD countries from 1975 to 1996 (Alesina et al., 2005),
interconnection rates and regulatory independence in the EU-15member states from 1997
to 2003 (Edwards andWaverman, 2006), political accountability and various performance
measures in telecommunications in 52 developed and developing countries from 1985 to
1999 (Gasmi, Noumba, and Recuero Virto, 2006), and telecommunications reforms and
network expansion in developing countries from 1985 to 1999 (Gasmi and Recuero Virto,
2008).
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fixed effects in the error term, thus giving rise to a dynamic panel
bias. To deal with this bias and with the potential endogeneity of other
regressors in the leverage equation,weuse theArellano andBond (1991)
and Arellano and Bover (1995) linear generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimators.More specifically,we use the dynamic System-GMM
model developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond
(1998). This model estimates a system of level and first-differenced
equations and uses lags of first-differenced variables as instruments
for equations in levels and lags of variables in levels as instruments for
equations in first-differences.31 For the validity of the GMM estimates
it is crucial, however, that the instruments are exogenous. We therefore
calculate the two-step Sargan-Hansen statistic under the null of joint
validity of the instruments and report the resulting p-values with
the regression results. To ensure that the lagged variables are valid
instruments, we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) autocorrelation test
control for AR(1) and AR(2). Because AR(2) was detected, we restrict
the lags instrumenting the lagged leverage to t − 3 and t − 4.
Tables VIII and IX report the results from estimating equations
(2) and (3). In both tables, we examine the full sample in Column (1),
and several subsamples in Columns (2)–(7). Table VIII shows that with
the exception of firms which are not regulated by an IRA (Column (3)),
or are state-controlled (Column (7)), the second lag of market leverage
has a significant positive effect on regulated prices. Moreover, a Wald
statistic test indicates that the first and second lags of market leverage
are jointly significantly. On the other hand, Table IX shows that the
lagged regulated prices do not have significant effect on leverage either
individually or jointly. Together, these results imply that, so long asfirms
are privately controlled and/or regulated by an IRA, leverage Granger-
causes regulated prices, but not vice versa. These results are consistent
with the hypothesis that regulated firms which are either privately
controlled or regulated by an IRA (or both), choose their leverage
strategically in order to induce regulators to set higher prices, and
inconsistent with the alternative hypotheses that long-term regulatory
commitments to prices induce firms to adjust their capital structure to
match their resulting expected revenue stream, or that leverage and
regulated prices are driven by a third variable that causes both of them.
The results are also inconsistent with the hypothesis that regulated
prices increasewhen the firm issuesmore equity, say because regulators
base prices on the firm’sWACC that is in turn decreasingwith the firm’s
leverage.
31. For estimation we used the xtabond2 Stata command created by David Roodman
(2006).
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6. The Subsample of Energy Utilities
So far our analysis was based on a diverse set of firms operating in a
wide array of industries. Although all of our regressions include sector
specific dummies, one may worry that the large heterogeneity of firms
in our sample and the fact that they are subject to different regulatory
environments biases our results in some way. To address this concern
we now reestimate ourmain specifications using a subsample of energy
utilities (gas and electricity). This group of firms is the largest in our
sample and comprises of 44 utilities and 354 firm-year observations
(46% of our full sample). Firms in this subsample are all regulated by
energy regulatory agencies and are subject to the same EU directives,
described in Section 2, which member states were required to transpose
into national legislation. It should also be noted that the “dash for debt”
concern was raised mainly in the context of energy utilities (see AEEG,
2007; Ofgem, 2008).
In TableX,we reestimate our baseline specification for the leverage
equation using random effects estimation. Themain difference between
the results in Tables IV–VII, and X is that the coefficients of the IRA and
the Private Control × IRA dummies are larger in absolute values and
more significant than in Section 5. Moreover, Column (1) in Table X
shows that as in Tables IV–VII, the coefficient of the Private Control
dummy is insignificant while the sum of the coefficients of the Private
Control and Private Control × IRA dummies (α1 + α3) is positive and
significant. This result is coefficientwithHypothesis 1 because it implies
that privately controlled regulated firms have a higher leverage than
state-control firms provided that they are regulated by an IRA. Columns
(2)–(4) show that this conclusion is not altered when Golden Shares are
taken into account, when we restrict attention only to firms that were
privatized during our sample period, and when we replace the Private
Control dummy with the Private Control_30 dummy.
Table XI presents the results of our Granger tests regarding the
interaction between leverage and regulated rates for the subsample of
energy utilities. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) report the results from
estimating equation (2), while Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) report
the results from estimating equation (3). The results are very similar
to those in Tables VIII and IX: the coefficients of the lagged leverage
terms in the price equation are jointly significant and so is their sum for
the full sample and the subsamples of privately controlled firms and
firms that are regulated by an IRA, but not for state-controlled firms.32
By contrast, the coefficients of the lagged prices are insignificant in
32. Unfortunately, we have only 52 firm-year observations on energy utilities without
an IRA and hence were unable to run Granger causality tests for this subsample of firms.
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Table X.
Leverage, Regulation and Ownership: Energy
Utilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Leverage Full Sample Full Sample Privatized Utilities Full Sample
Log of real total assets 0.032
∗ ∗ ∗
0.033
∗ ∗ ∗
0.034
∗ ∗ ∗
0.035
∗ ∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Fixed-to-total assets −0.024 −0.025 0.010 0.004
(0.097) (0.094) (0.127) (0.098)
EBIT-to-total assets −0.445∗ ∗ ∗ −0.443∗ ∗ ∗ −0.486∗ ∗ ∗ −0.444∗ ∗ ∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.062) (0.060)
Nondebt tax shield −2.935∗ ∗ ∗ −2.943∗ ∗ ∗ −3.540∗ ∗ ∗ −2.953∗ ∗ ∗
(0.725) (0.723) (0.770) (0.744)
GDP growth −0.019 −0.020 −0.019 −0.025∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.014)
Private control (α1) −0.012 −0.021 −0.059 –
(0.057) (0.057) (0.075) –
Private control_30 (α1) – – – 0.041
– – – (0.049)
IRA (α2) −0.134∗ ∗ ∗ −0.140∗ ∗ ∗ −0.156∗ ∗ ∗ −0.119∗ ∗ ∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.050) (0.035)
Private control × IRA (α3) 0.101∗ ∗ 0.110∗ ∗ 0.159∗ ∗ ∗ –
(0.049) (0.050) (0.061) –
Private control_30 × IRA (α3) – – – 0.094∗ ∗
– – – (0.045)
Golden shares (α4) – −0.082∗ −0.115∗ ∗ −0.055
– (0.050) (0.049) (0.057)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value test on α1 + α3 = 0 0.019 0.018 0.026 0.002
P-value test on α2 + α3 = 0 0.381 0.425 0.965 0.562
R2 within 0.322 0.320 0.338 0.337
Wald-test χ2 (p-value) 494.36 (0.00) 216.36 (0.00) 360.08 (0.00) 418.58 (0.00)
Hausman test χ2 (p-value) 1.52 (1.00) 8.42 (0.98) 6.11 (0.10) 11.08 (0.92)
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 44 [354] 44 [354] 33 [280] 44 [354]
The dependent variable,Market Leverage, and the regressors are all defined as in Tables III, IV–VII. Column (3), reports
the results for the subsample of energy utilities that were privatised during the period. All regressions include year
and country dummies. Random-effects estimates with robust standard errors. The Wald χ2 tests the null of that all
coefficients are jointly equal to zero. The Hausman χ2 tests the null of nonsystematic differences of the fixed and
random effects model. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5%, and
10%.
the leverage equation. These results are consistent with Hypothesis
2 that regulated prices increase when firms become more highly
leveraged.
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7. Conclusion
Following the large scale privatization and structural reforms in net-
work industries in Europe over the past 20 years, it appears that
European regulated utilities in telecommunications, electricity, natural
gas, water, and transportation, have accumulated large amounts of
debt. This phenomenon has been described by the UK Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the HM Treasury (DTI-HM, 2004)
as the “dash for debt,” and has raised concerns among policymakers
about the financial stability of regulated utilities and their ability to
finance future investments. Theoretical models and earlier empirical
work based on U.S data suggest however that high leverage is a natural
response of regulated firms to the inability of regulators to make long-
term commitments to prices. High leverage protects regulated firms
against the “regulatory opportunism” — the risk that regulators will
lower prices in the future once investments become sunk in order to
benefit consumers at the firm’s expense.
In this paper we examine this idea empirically, using a compre-
hensive panel of virtually all major publicly traded regulated utilities in
the EU-15 member states. Our data covers firms with various degrees
of state ownership that are either regulated by IRA or by ministries,
governmental committees, or local governments. This heterogeneity
allows us to examine the effect of private- versus state-ownership and of
regulatory independence on the capital structure of regulated firms and
its implications for regulated prices. Our analysis reveals that privately
controlled firms tend to have a higher leverage than state-controlled
firms provided that they are regulated by IRA, and that the increased
leverage is associated with higher regulated prices. By contrast, we
do not find a significant effect of leverage on prices in the case of state-
controlledfirms. These results provide strong support for thehypothesis
that privately controlled regulated firms rely on debt financing as a
way to induce IRA to set higher prices. To the extent that regulated
firms may take “regulatory opportunism” into account when making
investment decisions, our results suggest that debt financing may have
some desirable consequence because it may boost the incentives of
privately controlled regulated firms to invest. Of course, given that debt
financing also leads to higher regulated prices and may also increase
the likelihood of financial distress, it is clear that more research, both
theoretically and empirically, is needed to determine if the “dash for
debt” phenomenon is desirable and provides (at least in part) a solution
to a regulatory opportunism problem, or whether it is an unintended
consequence of the privatization of firms in network industries and
should be discouraged.
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Appendix A: Data Sources
Panel A. Ownership Data
Country
Individual Countries
Sources 1994–2004
All Countries Sources
1994–2004
Austria 1. Austrian Holding and Privatisation
Agency, www.oiag.at
1. Company Web Sites;
Belgium 1. Bureau Fe´de´ral du Plan (BFP),
www.plan.be, “Participations
Publiques dans le Secteur Marchand
en Belgique, 1997–2003”
2. Annual Reports;
Finland 1. Ministry of Trade & Industry,
“State—Owned Companies”
Publications, 1995, 2005
3. 20-F Reports;
France 1. La Caisse des De´poˆts,
www.caissedesdepots.fr/FR/index.
php
4. SEC, Filings & Forms (EDGAR),
www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml;
2. L’Agence des participations de l’E´tat
(APE), www.ape.minefi.gouv.fr/
5. Hoovers Company In-dept
Records;
3. Euronext,
www.euronext.com/home/0,3766,
1732,00.html
6. SDC Thomson Financial;
Germany 1. KfW,
www.kfw.de/EN_Home/index.jsp
7. Amadeus, Bureau van Dijk;
Greece 1. Athens Stock Exchange,
www.ase.gr/default_en.asp
8. Lexis Nexis, Business News;
2. Hellenic Capital Market Commission,
Annual Reports 1999–2005,
www.hcmc.gr/english/index2.htm
9. Privatization Barometer,
www.privatizationbarometer
.net;
Italy 1. MEF, Dipartimento del Tesoro, “Libro
bianco sulle privatizzazioni,” April
2001, 2002 and 2003
10. Financial Times;
2. MEF, Dipartimento del Tesoro, “La
relazione sulle privatizzazioni,”
1997–2000
11. For Banks and Financial
Institutions: IMF Working
Paper, 2005, “State-Owned
Banks, Stability, Privatization,
and Growth: Practical Policy
Decisions in a World Without
Empirical Proof,”
www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0510.pdf
3. MEF, Dipartimento del Tesoro, “Libro
verde sulle partecipazioni dello Stato,”
November 1992
4. MEF, www.dt.tesoro.it/Aree-
Docum/Partecipaz/Partecipaz/
Partecipate.htm_cvt.htm
Continued
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Appendix A:
Continued
Panel A. Ownership data
Country
Individual Countries
Sources 1994–2004
All Countries Sources
1994–2004
5. IRI (2001) “Le privatizzazioni in Italia,
1992–2000,” edited by Bemporad S. and E.
Reviglio
6. Mediobanca (2000) “Le privatizzazioni in
Italia dal 1992”
7. Borsa Italiana, “Operazioni di
Privatizzazione—Anni 1993–2006,”
www.borsaitaliana.it/documenti/
ufficiostampa/datistorici/
privatizzazioni_pdf.htm
8. Consob, www.consob.it
Netherlands 1. Ministry of Finance,
www.minfin.nl/en/subjects,
government-participation
2. Morgan Stanley, Journal of Applied
Corporate Finance, Vol. 9, Number 1,
Spring 1996
3. OECD, 1998, Reforming Public
Enterprises: The Netherlands
Portugal 1. Ministry of Finance and Public
Administration, Economic Research and
Forecasting Department (DGEP),
www.dgep.pt/menprinci.html
Spain 1. Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones
Industriales, www.sepi.es
2. Economic Monthly Report (1995 and
1999), La Caixa, www.lacaixa.
comunicacions.com
3. The Comisio´n Nacional del Mercado de
Valores (CNMV), www.cnmv.es
Sweden 1. Ministry of Industry, Employment and
Communication, Annual Report for
Government-Owned Companies,
2000–2005,www.sweden.
gov.se/sb/d/2106/a/19792
UK 1. “Who Owns Whom in the UK Electricity
Industry,” Electricity Association Policy
Research, June 2003
2. www.ukprivatisation.com
Continued
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Appendix A:
Continued
Panel B: Additional company data
Data sources used to identify privatized companies through public offers of shares in EU
markets, and track name changes and M&A activity
1. Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation, SDC Platinum Global New Issues
Database and Mergers & Acquisitions Database
2. Dow Jones Newswires, Dow Jones
3. The Privatization Barometer (www.privatizationbarometer.net)
Accounting and Financial Market Data
1. Worldscope
Panel C: Institutional data
Data sources used for the IRA establishment, legal protection of investors and political
orientation
1. Gilardi. F. (2002) “Policy Credibility and Delegation to IRA: A Comparative Empirical
Analysis,” Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6), 873–893
not in use anymore?
2. Pagano, M. and Volpin, F. (2005) “The Political Economy of Corporate Governance,”
American Economic Review, 95(4), 1005–1030
3. Bortolotti B. and M. Faccio (2008), “Government Control of Privatized Firms,” Review
of Financial Studies, 22(8), 2907–2939.
Panel D: Price data
Data sources used to identify series of price indexes of final consumer prices in
regulated sectors
1. EUROSTAT—New Cronos: for electricity, gas, water, telecommunications
2. National statistics and ASECAP for freight roads
Data sources for country specific interest rates
1. Long term interest rates. OECD Factbook 2006, Environmental and social statistics
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Appendix B.
The Sample Firms
Sample IPO Year of
Company Country Period Year Privatization Status
Telecommunications (15 firms)
Telekom Austria AG Austria 1998–2005 2000 2000 PRIV
Belgacom SA Belgium 1994–2005 2004 – SC
TeleDanmark AS Denmark 1994–2005 1994 1998∗ PRIV
Sonera Finland 1998–2002 1998 – SC
France Telecom France 1994–2005 1997 2004 PRIV
Deutsche Telekom AG Germany 1994–2005 1996 – SC
OTE (Hellenic Telecom
Organization)
Greece 1994–2005 2000 2002 PRIV
EIRCOM Ireland 1999–2005 – 1999 PC
Telecom Italia SpA Italy 1994–2005 1991 1997∗ PRIV
Koninklijke KPN NV Netherlands 1994–2005 1994 1994∗ PC
Portugal Telecom SA Portugal 1994–2005 1995 1997∗ PRIV
Telefonica de Espana SA Spain 1994–2005 1987 1994 PC
Telia AB Sweden 1997–2005 2000 – SC
British Telecommunications
PLC
UK 1994–2005 1984 1994 PC
Kingston Communications UK 1998–2005 1999 2000 PRIV
Electricity (27 firms)
EVN AG Austria 1994–2005 1989 – SC
Verbund Austria 1994–2005 1988 – SC
Fortum Finland 1994–2005 1998 – SC
Electricite´ de France France 1994–2005 2005 – SC
MVV Energie AG Germany 1996–2005 1999 – SC
VEBA AG Germany 1994–2005 1987 1994 PC
VIAG AG Germany 1994–1999 1986 1994 PC
Public Power Corporation SA Greece 1998–2005 2001 – SC
Enel Italy 1994–2005 1999 2004∗ PRIV
Edison Italy 1994–2005 – 1994 PC
AEMMilano Italy 1996–2005 1998 2004∗ PRIV
AEM Torino SpA Italy 1999–2005 2000 – SC
Terna (Enel) Italy 2000–2005 2004 2004∗ PRIV
EnerTad Italy 1996–2005 – 1996 PC
EDP Electricidade de Portugal Portugal 1994–2005 1997 2004∗ PRIV
ENDESA (Empresa Nacional
de Electricidad SA)
Spain 1994–2005 1988 1997 PRIV
Iberdola Spain 1994–2005 – 1994 PC
Red Electrica de Espana SA Spain 1995–2005 1999 1999 PRIV
Union electrica Fenosa Spain 1994–2005 – 1994 PC
National Grid Group PLC UK 1995–2005 1995 1995 PC
ScottishPower/Hydro-Electric UK 1994–2005 – 1994 PC
Scottish and Southern Energy UK 1994–2005 1990 1994 PC
Continued
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Appendix B.
Continued
Sample IPO Year of
Company Country Period Year Privatization Status
United Utilities UK 1994–2005 – 1994 PC
British Energy PLC UK 1996–2005 1996 1996 PC
Viridian UK 1994–2005 – 1994 PC
National Power—PowerGen
Ltd
UK 1994–2001 1991 1994 PC
Yorkshire Electricity Group UK 1994–1997 1990 1994 PC
Gas (11 firms)
OMV AG Austria 1994–2005 1987 1994 PC
Distrigaz SA Belgium 2001–2005 1996 2001∗ PRIV
Fluxys Belgium 2001–2005 – 2005∗ PRIV
Gaz de France France 1994–2005 2005 – SC
Amga SpA Italy 1996–2005 1996 – SC
Acsm SpA Italy 1998–2005 1999 – SC
SNAM Rete Gas SpA Italy 2000–2005 2004 2000 PC
Enagas Spain 2000–2005 – 2000 PC
Gas Natural SDG SA Spain 1994–2005 1996 1994 PC
British Gas PLC UK 1994–2005 1986 1994 PC
Centrica UK 1996–2005 – 1996 PC
Freight Roads (8 firms)
Autoroutes du Sud de la France France 1999–2005 2002 2005 PRIV
SAPRR (Autoroutes
Paris-Rhin-Rhone)
France 2001–2005 2004 2005 PRIV
SANEF (Autoroutes du Nord et
de l’Est de la France)
France 2002–2005 2005 2005 PRIV
Autostrade SpA Italy 1994–2005 1999 1999 PRIV
Autostrada Torino-Milano Italy 1994–2005 – 1994 PC
Sias—Societa` Autostrada
Torino Milano
Italy 1998–2005 – 1998 PC
Brisa Auto Estradas de Portugal Portugal 1995–2005 1997 1998 PRIV
Abertis Spain 1994–2005 – 1994 PC
Multiutilities (7 firms)
Suez France 1994–2005 1987 1994 PC
HERA Italy 2003–2005 2003 – SC
ACEA SpA Italy 1998–2005 1999 – SC
Acegas Italy 1997–2005 2001 – SC
Meta SpA Italy 2002–2004 2003 – SC
RWE Germany 1994–2005 – 1994 PC
Fraport AG Germany 1994–2005 2001 – SC
Water (13 firms)
Vivendi France 1994–2005 – 1994 PC
Veolia France 2000–2005 – 2001 PRIV
Water Supply & Sewerage
Systems Co of Athens
Greece 2000–2005 1999 – SC
Continued
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Continued
Sample IPO Year of
Company Country period year privatization Status
Thessaloniki Water Greece 2001–2005 2001 – SC
Acquedotto Nicolay Italy 1994–2005 – – PRIV
Condotta Acque Potabili (dal
2005: Acque Potabili)
Italy 1994–2004 – 2001 PC
Severn Trent PLC UK 1994–2005 1989 1994 PC
Yorkshire Water PLC UK 1994–2005 1989 1994 PC
South West Water PLC UK 1994–2005 1989 1994 PC
Anglian Water PLC UK 1994–2005 1989 1994 PC
Thames Water PLC UK 1994–2000 1989 1994 PC
Wessex Water PLC UK 1994–1998 1989 1994 PC
AEA Technology PLC UK 1997–2005 1996 1997 PC
Airports (6)
Flughafen Wien AG Austria 1994–2005 1992 2000 PRIV
Kobenhavns Lufthavne A/S Denmark 1994–2005 1994 2000∗ PRIV
Aeroporto di Venezia Italy 2002–2005 2005 – SC
Aeroporto di Firenze SpA Italy 1999–2005 2000 2000 SC
Aeroporti di Roma Italy 1994–2000 1997 2000 PRIV
BAA PLC UK 1994–2005 1987 1994 PC
Port and Docks (5 firms)
Piraeus Port Authority Greece 2001–2005 2003 – SC
Associated British Ports Hldgs UK 1994–2005 1983 1994 PC
Forth Ports PLC UK 1994–2005 1992 1994 PC
Mersey Docks & Harbour Co UK 1994–2004 1970 1994 PC
Railtrack Group PLC UK 1996–2002 1996 1996 PC
The year of privatization is the first year in which the state’s stake in the firm fell under 50%. An asterisk next to the
year of privatization indicates that the state holds a golden share which gives it special control rights, such as the right
to appoint board members or veto proposed acquisitions. The status column indicates whether the firm is privately
controlled throughout our sample (PC), state-controlled throughout our sample (SC), or was privatized during our
sample period (PRIV).
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